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ABSTRACT 
 The mountainous region of northern Pakistan is seismically active as Indian plate is subducting 
beneath the Eurasian plate. Various geological phenomena are active due to the mountain building 
and landslides are one of the most destructive natural disasters in the Karakoram range. The northern 
part of Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan, falling in this region is no exception to that. Attabad was a remote 
village situated on the right bank of Hunza River at a ground distance of almost 125 km from Gilgit 
city. The area falls into Darkut-Karakoram metamorphic complex composed of granites, 
granodiorite, and gneiss. A devastating landslide occurred on 4th January 2010, as mode of circular 
failure which blocked the Hunza River forming a lake behind. The debris material hit the opposite 
rock cliff, due to narrow gorge the landslide mass travelled downstream 1.5km with huge debris 
surges, hitting 8 houses in lower Attabad which came under rubble and 19 people died. Aga Khan 
Agency for Habitat previously FOCUS Pakistan developed an inventory of active landslides across 
the KKH in Hunza in 2000-2001, however this landslide was not identified. Later in 2002 after the Astore 
earthquake initial cracks developed at the top of the slope. The 8th October Kashmir earthquake 
destabilized and U-shaped demarcation appeared across the slope. Anthropogenic activities like 
irrigation of lands, seepage of water from rain and snow melt water further destabilized the land. 
Finally, an earthquake in November 2009 in Hindukush region triggered the landslide and brittle failure 
occurred on 4th January 2010.  
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Attabad which is a remote village situated on 
the right bank of Hunza River (downstream 
direction) at a ground distance of almost 20-
25km from  Tehsil headquarter Aliabad in N_E 
direction. The village constitutes round about 
100 settlements, two middle schools (one AKES 
and one is Government middle school) one 
dispensary where only first aid treatment was 
available. The area was settled on slope profile 
a landslide prone area, which is activated 
several times in past and the locals were 
evacuated from the area. 
The process of landslide started during the long 
lasting rains in early 1993-94 as a result of which 
rock falls events were noticed at the lower and 
eastern ends of the slope. In 2002 the particular 
area became active Local Council informed 
FOCUS Pakistan to assess the situation, as a 
response FOUCS Geologist visited the area and 
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assessed the situation. At that time the upper 
scarp was visible and down ward movement 
was 5-13 feet while the aperture was 1-4 feet.  
The remaining stable rock segments were visible 
at places supporting the unconsolidated 
material. The surface boulders were sunk into 
the slope and some were detached from their 
position.  The findings of this assessment was 
that there were 23 houses on the moving slope, 
a potential threat exists there, Human lives, 
settlements and cultivated lands were 
vulnerable. If this slope movement occurs, it will 
block the Hunza  
River causing the submergence of KKH and the 
nearby village (Ayeenabad), similarly a flash 
flood will occur which will sweep the lands along 
the bank of river towards downstream. The 
assessment report was shared with the local 
council and government.  
 
Figure 1: geologic map of region. 
1.2 Geologic and Tectonic setting 
The problematic area is a slope varying from 250 
to 750. An overburden of maximum 15 meter 
thickness is underlain by granite rock from head 
to the toe of the slope. Overburden is of colluvial 
nature comprising of boulders, cobbles and 
gravels with some sand and silt. Boulders and 
cobbles are sub angular to sub rounded with 
sandy and silty matrix. The rock exposed at the 
toe and head of the slope is highly foliated, 
jointed and moderately weathered. The 
foliation is striking east- west and dipping into the 
slope. One set of joints is dipping towards slope 
at steeper angle while another joint set is found 
to be almost vertical and striking at right angle 
to the slope face. In addition to major joints sets 
other joints are also found [1]. 
Attabad area falls into Darkut-Karakoram 
metamorphic complex according to the 
geological map of Pakistan. They are 
dominantly granodiorite composition. High 
grade metamorphism of the rocks up to gneiss 
grade has been reported. Bed rocks are 
massive in nature with maximum strength. 
Two main faults in north Pakistan i.e., Main 
Karakoram Thrust (MKT) and Karakoram fault are 
passing near by the Attabad one on SW side 
and other on NE, respectively. These two faults 
are the source of seismicity in Gilgit-Baltistan. 
There are also some minor and active faults in 
the region; Upper Hunza Fault, Raikot-Sassi Fault, 
Sassi Fault, Stak Fault, and Shamran Fault are 
known active source of seismicity [2] . 
 
2. SEISMIC AND ANTHROPOGENIC 
ACTIVITIES AND ITS IMPACTS ON ATABAD 
LANDSLIDE 
1.1 Seismic activities 
Earthquake events have great impact on the 
activation of the landslides worldwide in 
addition to other factors like rain and 
anthropogenic activities. The Attabad landslide 
is one of the examples which have been 
activated by the earthquake event in 
2002.According to the notable and local 
population, there was a heavy rainfall (long 
lasting) and cause intensive rock fall along the 
slope (now problematic), affecting the land 
property without any loss of life. Just after the 
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displacement adjacent to the contact 
between rock slope and slope material, but 
these were remained at same position without 
any further changes for long time [3]. It is likely 
that this cracking was caused by a damaging 
earthquake, which has occurred at the junction 
of Astore valley and Indus valley on the 16th 
November 2002 [4].  
 
The initial crack at the top of the slope has 
developed after the Astore earthquake as 
noticed by the local community and FOCUS 
Geologist visit the landslide after that event. 
Monitoring points were installed and the cracks 
were monitored by CERT (community 
emergency response team) volunteer. Lateral 
movement and downward movement data of 
that visit is mentioned here; 
Downward movement of the slope (DWM) 
DWM at P 1= 5-10ft, DWM at P3=4ft 
DWM at P4=3.5ft,    DWM at P6=13ft 
Lateral movement or aperture of the cracks 
(LM)  
LM at P1=3ft,   LM at P2=1-1.5ft 
LM at P3=4ft,   LM at P4=2ft 
After the earthquake event of Astore 2002 
cracks became widened and from 2002-04 the 
landslide remained dormant. No changes were 
recorded during this time period.  
 
 
The devastating earthquake of Kashmir 
occurred on 8th October 2005 having a 
magnitude of 7.6. There was no apparent 
increase in the ground cracking problem noted 
following the 2005 major Kashmir earthquake 
[4]. However new tensional cracks were 
observed on the NW side of the slope and 
cracks also appeared in 3 houses due to 
dynamic loading of the unstable slope after the 
Kashmir earthquake as reported by the locals. 
The monitoring data on the specific points is not 
available as at that time the data was 
maintained in hard form, therefore it is difficult to 
show the exact change in the cracks dimension, 
however according to the locals changes were 
occurred after the landslide which were also 
reported in newspaper. 
Further tensional cracks systems were inspected 
by FOCUS in 2007, and their location, size and 
form indicative of a buildup and release of the 
stresses. These stresses may have been related 
to the 2005 earthquake as it was distinctly felt by 
many people in Hunza [4].     
Three events have been recorded according to 
the USGS database 1st on 11th February 2007, 2nd 
Date Time LAT LON DEP MAG MT
11/6/2007 15:46.7 38.155 73.264 131.3 5.5 mwc
10/26/2007 50:06.7 35.304 76.753 10 5.2 mwc
2/11/2007 39:18.4 36.728 72.971 53.8 5.1 mwc
Figure 2: Map showing the seismic event 
occurred from 2002-2009 in the surrounding 
of Attabad. The earthquake events which 
have impacted the landslide are highlighted 
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on 26th October 2007 and 3rd on 6th November 
2007.  
 
1.2 Seismic activities 
 
The first settlement at Attabad started in early 
1825, at the time there were only 15 families who 
came from Altit village. For the purpose of 
cultivation irrigation channels were constructed 
to irrigate the land. The people were residing at 
the old clutter area local name “Khun” (cluster 
of houses). With the passage of time and 
increase in the population the people started 
construct new irrigation channel to settle on the 
eastern slope gradually where the current 
landslide event has occurred on 4th January 
2010. The eastern slope gradually cultivated 
and developed and almost 23 houses settled 
before the activation of landslide in 2002. In 
2003 a Tajik seismologist [5] visited the area and 
suggested to leave the areas and use the 
unstable slope for the purpose of cultivation of 
trees and gardening through the drip irrigation. 
Control irrigation system and if possible repairing 
of the water channels. However local people 
ignored his suggestions and continued to live 
there and grown the crops. After the 2005 
earthquake new cracks were developed on the 
eastern side of the slope, tensional cracks were 
also observed in 3 houses (according to the 
locals). Demarcation (development of the 
crack) of the whole slope occurred in 2007 and 
new tensional cracks develop throughout the 
slope and in almost 10 houses out of 23.  
Even after the development of the tension 
cracks in the field and in structures people didn’t 
stop the irrigation of water to the fields. Water 
from the channels, irrigation water and 
sewerage water was continuously infiltrating in 
to the slope which further destabilized the 
landslide due to the increased saturation. 
3. SEISMIC AND ANTHROPOGENIC 
ACTIVITIES AND ITS IMPACTS ON ATABAD 
LANDSLIDE 
3.1 Seismic activities 
The devastating landslide incident occurred on 
the 4th of January, 2010 at 11:30 Am, landslide 
(rock fall) events started 2 days back from the 
same area. The people were already 
evacuated from Attabad (Bala) due to the 
movement of the landslide. The whole slope 
mass including hard rock and unconsolidated 
material has detached suddenly from the hard 
rock slope. The debris material has hit the 
opposite side rock ridge and landslide mass 
diverted with air pressure due to narrow gorge 
towards upstream and downstream direction in 
form of debris surges.  As a result of debris 
surges downstream 8 houses came under the 
rubble in which 19 people reported to be killed.  
 
Figure 3: A NE aerial view of the Attabad landslide 
Source: FOCUS Pakistan, it triggered from the left side 
and blocked the narrow gorge of Hunza River and 
KKH. The debris material traveled 800m upstream and 
1200m downstream while the length of the actual 
blockage was almost 950m.Totally the spread of the 
landslide debris was approximately 3km. The 
downstream surges damaged 8 houses in which 19 
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material spread at the upper surface of the landslide 
mass and it was squeezed out from the riverbed. 
 
Rock fall events started two days earlier of the 
landslide disaster and it continued till the event. 
According to one of the eye witnessed who was 
at Attabad village, said that a crack started 
from eastern end and moved towards NW side 
and crack started to open from western side 
and connected with the eastern crack fumes 
came out with the opening of the crack. At the 
same time multiple cracks developed in the 
whole landslide mass. The slopes slipped down 
100ft cracking sounds were heard and the rock 
mass stopped for a while and then moved down 
at once and hit the river terrace. The river 
terrace material composed of cobbles, 
pebbles, clay and silt were squeezed and the 
whole river terrace material spread at over the 
whole debris material which was unique thing. 
 
Figure 4: An aerial View of Attabad landslide, Source: 
FOCUS Pakistan, according to the interpretation of 
the features developed after the landslide, the 
landslide event occurred in 3 stages. First the central 
eastern portion came down as result the left portion 
came down due to dragging force and at the third 
stage; upper rock ridge came as observed at the top 
of the clay deposits above the debris mass. Minor 
time difference anticipated between the 1st and 2nd 
portion which the 3rd phase came after the 
settlement of the whole debris mass. 
  
3.2  Attabad Landslide 
Attabad landslide created a dam along the 
Hunza River. KKH the strategic road between 
China and Pakistan was also blocked after this 
event and almost 25000 people trapped in 
Gojal valley. The people of the valley depend 
on for their income resources on trade, 
agriculture as potatoes are the cash crop of the 
valley.  But they couldn’t grow potatoes as 
they cannot transport fertilizer and potatoes to 
sell in the marked. So the people of the valley 
faced problems in terms of transportation, 
trade, agriculture, financial crises physiological 
and educational hindrance.  
There was no any trigger for the landslide. The 
weather conditions were cold and dry, but not 
exceptionally so, but there were no recorded 
seismic events of sufficient magnitude to trigger 
the landslide. Thus, it appears that this is a time 
dependent failure [6]. 
3.3 Attabad Lake Monitoring 
Instantly after the formation of the dam, storage 
of water started at the back and lake formation 
initiated. FOCUS Pakistan geologist along with 
the CERT volunteers started the monitoring of 
the lake both upstream and downstream at the 
spillway and recorded the changes in the water 
level in the lake. For the 1st week the rate of 
water level rise in the lake was higher and after 
that the water level rise gradually decreased 
with the increasing in the area of lake. The fig.4 
below show the trend of water level changes in 
the lake from 1st February to 1st July 2010. 
In the initial days the rate of water level rise was 
higher i.e. 24ft/day as the area of the lake was 
less, but with the increase in the lake dimensions 
the rate of water rise gradually fell down. 
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Seepage of water at the toe of the barrier 
started in the 1st week of March that also 
decreased the water level rise in the lake. 
However, in the month of April and May again 
the rate of water level increased gradually due 
to the increase in the discharge of water from 
the different glacier sources and streams. 
 
The discharge rates in the winter and early 
spring remained low in Gojal tehsil 825cusecs to 
1100 cusec till mid-April. After that the discharge 
rate gradually increased from the mid of April. 
The peak discharge in the valley remains from 
mid of June-August mid.  
On 21st May 2010, the excavation of the spillway 
was almost 51ft i.e. 15.54m and the excavation 
of the saddle was stopped for the safety 
purpose by the FWO (Frontier Works 
Organization). The total height of was spillway 
before the exaction was 414ft from the river 
bed, if we subtract 51ft (excavated portion) 
from total height, the remaining was 364ft. 
Considering 363ft height, freeboard at that time, 
rate of water change the possible overtopping 
date was anticipated and shared with the local 
government and NDMA. 
 
At the time of overtopping the lake had 
reached a length of 21km, and an estimated 
volume of about  
450x10, 000000 m³ of water [7]. The newly 
developed lake inundated four villages i.e. 
Ayeenabad, Shishkat, Gulmit and Hussaini in 
which 171 houses were also submerged. It also 
destroyed almost 23km of KKH (Karakorum High-
Way) including five bridges on road both RRC 
and wooden. People of the Gojal faced severe 
problems in transportation as they have to travel 
through boats across the lake.With increase in 
the lake length and volume of water in the 
reservoir, the pressure built on the Attabad Lake. 
Initial sounds/blasts were heard in the month of 
April 2010 at Shishkat village. The local people 
became anxious about the development of 
sounds and intensity of the sounds increased at 
nigh time. Second time sounds were also heard 
on 28th May one day before the overtopping. 
On the request of the local government 
FOUCUS Pakistan conducted the assessment of 
the sounds, may be these develop due to the 
Figure 5: Showing the trend of water rise in the lake 
from 13th Jan to 13th May 2010. Data from 5th to 12th 
Jan is not reflected in this graph as rate of change 
in the lakes level was higher in the 1st week of 
January, due to which remaining data was not 
clearly visible and rate of change for the 
remaining days was not that much higher and 
difference was comparatively less.  Therefore, to 
indicate the data clearly on the graph 1st few 
days’ data not reflected.   
Figure 6: The graph reflects the rate of change of 
seepage at the toe of the Attabad landslide from 
5th March to 6th May. Due to the safety and 
security reason the data collection on the 
seepage stopped as over topping from the 
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collapsing of the banks or possible settlements 
along the river terraces. But this was not the 
case. If we study the geological map of Pakistan 
six offshoots are running parallel to MKT (Main 
Karakorum Thrust) from Chalt to Attabad as 
shown in fig.1 above. The sounds were coming 
possibly from the settlement of the local faults 
due to the reservoir pressure built up as a result 
in increase in the water volume in the Attabad 
Lake.  
4 EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AND ITS 
MECHANISM 
4.1 Early warning system 
After the formation of the lake and increasing 
level of water at the back of the landslide, the 
threat was also increasing with the passage of 
time. Villages at the upstream were submerging 
with increasing level of water while downstream 
the threat of dam outburst floods. According to 
the [7] four scenarios were stated, considering 
the worst -case scenario and possible impact on 
the downstream low-lying areas, an early 
warning system was crucial. FOCCUS Pakistan 
felt then need of the EWS, installed the Early 
Warning System with the close coordination of 
local government. FOCUS Pakistan provided the 
technical assistance/services including the 
established of the camp and installment of the 








Figure 7: The above sketch shows the structure of the 
Early Warning System. Technical persons from both 
Government and FOCUS Pakistan were at the 
Attabad monitoring camp. In case of any unforeseen 
situation at the barrier, the technical person will 
inform the DC and regional councils. On the behalf of 
the government DC will declare the activation of 
EWS. Then through the orders government school 
teachers, police/levis and contact persons to 
respond to the emergency situation. On the other 
hand the councils will inform the CERT and contact 
person to be ready to response to the emergency 
situation. The final benefit will be for the communities 
at risk of the dam outburst flood. 
4.2 Lake Monitoring Mechanism  
FOCUS HVRA team in close collaboration with 
the government agencies PWD & police jointly 
developed a monitoring mechanism and the 
lake was monitored, and situation reports were 
shared with the local government and FOCUS 
management for planning and implantation. 
CCTV cameras were installed above the lake 
barrier are being used by FOCUS Pakistan staff 
to monitor the lake round the clock.      
 
 
4.3 Early warning mechanism 
The early warning systems were installed at 12 
vulnerable locations starting from Salmanabad 
to Danyore. EWS was based on cellular Telenor 
sim, SMS will be sending to the sim and all the 
systems will be triggered at once giving alarm 
singles. In case of any emergency situation at 
the Attabad DC Hunza would be informed and  
 he was the final authority to give orders for the 
trigger of the EWS.  
Figure 8: CCTV cameras installed at the 
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4.4 Demarcation of Vulnerable areas 
downstream  
Considering the worst-case scenario in case of 
Attabad dam outburst and possible impact on 
the downstream, vulnerable villages and 
hotpots were highlighted and risk population 
was shared with the government and relevant  
stakeholders. In this context an exercise for the 
demarcation of vulnerable locations was done 
with the help of local government of District 
Gilgit and Hunza-Nagar, for this expertise of 
AKCSP were used. Safer areas were considered 
above 60m from the current river flow and 
populations leaving below were highlighted 
under the threat of Lake Outburst Flood.  
Potential landslides activation like Salmanabad, 
Phaker, Miacher, Khanabad, Mayoon and 
Hussainabad were also highlighted and shared 
with the local government and accordingly risky 
communities were educated and prepared to 
face the potential risk in case of Lake Outburst. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Attabad landslide disaster was one of the huge 
disasters in History of Pakistan as it blocked the 
Hunza River, KKH and upstream villages were 
submerged and remain cutoff for the rest of the 
country. In the first part the impact of the seismic 
events on the Attabad landslide is done, 
however due to the unavailability of the 
sufficient data on ground monitoring of the 
landslide and exact changes in the cracks after 
the earthquake events, linking of the exact 
changes was difficult, instead general changes 
are linked. The second part shows the analysis of 
the lake monitoring data including water level 
rise, seepage, and flow data. Moreover, lake 
monitoring mechanism and early warning 
systems installed for monitoring and early 
warning to vulnerable communities settled on 
the low laying areas along the Hunza River till 
Gilgit is also discussed in this paper. Overall, it 
was well coordinated efforts by government, 
AKDN, Army and other stakeholders to reduce 
the impact of growing lake and in case outburst 
preparations were in placed considering the 
worst-case scenario. Vulnerable communities 
were trained, and prepared, early warning 
system activated, safer areas identified, 
evacuation drills conducted to timely 
evacuated through the pre-identified routs to 
safer locations.    
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